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Spectrum in India
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Abstract
Theoretical predictions of the impact of corruption on economic efficiency are 
ambiguous, with models allowing for positive, negative, or neutral effects. While 
much evidence exists on levels of corruption, less is available on its impact, 
particularly its impacts on consumer markets. This paper investigates empiri-
cally the effect of the corrupt sale of spectrum licenses to ineligible firms on the 
wireless- telecommunications market in India. I find that the corrupt allocation 
had, at worst, no impact on the number of subscribers, prices, usage, revenues, 
competition, and measures of quality. I argue that the market-based transfer of 
licenses to competent firms other than the original awardees, combined with 
fierce competition in the telecommunications sector, may have mitigated poten-
tial deleterious impacts of corruption on consumers. These results suggest that 
the original corrupt allocation did not matter, which provides support for the 
Coase theorem.
1. Introduction
Theoretical predictions of the impact of corruption on economic efficiency are 
ambiguous. One such prediction is that corruption greases the wheels of an econ-
omy by allowing firms to bypass inefficient regulations (Leff 1964; Huntington 
1968). On the other hand, the illicit nature of corruption could prove distortion-
ary (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). A third view 
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that has received less attention in the literature is that corruption could simply 
represent a transfer from the government to corrupt officials or firms with no 
impact on efficiency: bribery in the process for allocating licenses may be neutral 
since the most efficient firms can pay the highest bribes (Lui 1985), or efficient re-
sale implies that the initial allocation may not matter (Coase 1959, 1960).
While much recent empirical work documents the existence of high levels of 
corruption in developing countries,1 evidence of the impact of corruption is less 
voluminous. The studies that exist suggest harmful impacts on firm performance 
and economic activity (see, for example, Sequeira and Djankov 2010; Fisman and 
Svensson 2007; Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira 2012; Bertrand et al. 2007),2 but evi-
dence of the impact on consumer markets remains limited.
This paper investigates empirically the effect of corruption on consumer mar-
kets by examining how the corrupt allocation of licenses to ineligible firms af-
fected the wireless-telecommunications market in India. In early 2008, the De-
partment of Telecommunications (DoT) in India allocated lucrative licenses to 
provide wireless-telecommunications service. Instead of using an auction3 to 
limit the number of entrants and discover the market price, the licenses were sold 
at fixed June 2001 prices using erratic rules designed to favor firms connected 
to then–Communication and Information Technology minister Andimuthu 
Raja. Subsequent investigations by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India 
(CAG) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) revealed that Raja received 
bribes of up to US$1 billion to award licenses to companies that otherwise would 
not have qualified for them. The ensuing scandal almost brought down the rul-
ing United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government (see Yardley and Timmons 
[2010] for one of many commentaries) and dominated political discourse in In-
dia for over 2 years.
This incident of corruption provides a compelling context in which to test for 
effects of corruption on markets and understand what determines the eventual 
impact on consumers. The scale of corruption was massive (the most widely cited 
estimates of the loss to the government are around US$44.2 billion (CAG 2010),4 
which is equivalent to the entire defense budget)5 and involved an important sec-
1 Examples of studies estimating the magnitude of bribes paid to government officials for bend-
ing or breaking rules include Olken and Barron (2009), Svensson (2003), Bertrand et al. (2007), 
and Hunt (2007); those documenting embezzlement of funds from public programs include Olken 
(2006, 2007), Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2012), Reinikka and Svensson (2004), and Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar (2013a, 2013b).
2 In addition, a large literature using cross-country growth regressions (for example, Mauro 1995) 
finds a negative effect of corruption on growth.
3 As Hazlett (2008) suggests, there is widespread consensus that market mechanisms are superior 
to administrative methods in allocating radio frequency spectrum.
4 For comparison, the total revenue raised from the sale of all spectrum in the United States was 
US$53 billion (Hazlett and Muñoz 2009, p. 425), and the sale of third-generation (3G) wireless cel-
lular licenses in the United Kingdom and Germany raised a combined US$80 billion (Klemperer 
2002, p. 169).
5 India’s total government spending in 2010–11 was US$247.2 billion (see Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance, Key Features of Budget 2010–2011 [http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2010-11/bh/
bh1.pdf]). All conversions are calculated at the exchange rate valid on the applicable date; for exam-
This content downloaded from 129.170.116.235 on June 07, 2018 10:47:28 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
 Corruption and Consumer Markets 77
tor in India’s burgeoning economy (Kotwal, Ramaswami, and Wadhwa 2011) 
that “typically [has] large and persistent positive spillovers to the entire econ-
omy” (Cramton et al. 2011, p. S170). Much information about the corrupt sales 
was revealed afterward. While the licenses were eventually rescinded—4 years af-
ter being awarded—the interim period, especially prior to the widespread cover-
age of the scandal in late 2010, provides a window in which to observe the impact 
of the corrupt allocation.
Corruption here maps well into the Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 599) frame-
work, as it involved the “sale of government property for private gain” by a gov-
ernment official. I can test whether this sale was distortionary because inefficient 
firms received licenses through their connections or was productive because 
eli gibility rules were keeping otherwise-efficient firms from receiving them. Of 
course, if licenses and spectrum could be simply bought and sold on a secondary 
market, these questions would be moot. But in India—like elsewhere—the direct 
sale of licenses and spectrum is expressly forbidden, and moreover fairly strin-
gent rules govern mergers and acquisitions as well as foreign direct investment 
(FDI).6 Whether corruption in the presence of such transfer restrictions affects 
efficiency is the focus of this paper.
This debate is not merely academic or theoretical: understanding whether cor-
ruption hurts efficiency is important given that the often-draconian responses 
to corruption in developing countries—with low state capacity, this may involve 
simply shutting down economic activity—may be worse than the effects of cor-
ruption itself.7 Amid the political furor in India, some have disputed whether the 
corrupt allocation has hurt the telecommunications market.8
To examine the consequences of malfeasance in license allocation, I rely on a 
simple difference-in-differences approach, using the variation across regions in 
the number of corruptly awarded licenses and the one-time allocation of licenses 
on a single day in January 2008. Differences in the number of corruptly awarded 
licenses appear to be driven by the use of existing spectrum by the defense forces,9 
a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the amount of corruption. The avail-
ability of detailed data across time allows me to examine the effect of illicitly 
ple, if a currency figure refers to January 2008, I use an exchange rate of 40 rupees to the dollar, the 
average for the month, from OANDA, Currency Converter (http://www.oanda.com).
6 Note that there is a current policy debate over whether resale of spectrum should be allowed 
and over the regulations governing mergers and foreign direct investment (see, for example, TRAI 
2013).
7 In India, for example, numerous key defense purchase decisions were put on hold after a brib-
ery scandal related to helicopter purchases was uncovered; in another case, all construction activity 
in the city of Mumbai ceased after the discovery of previous malfeasance (see Lakshmi 2013; Bajaj 
2012).
8 For example, the former Communications and Information Technology minister Kapil Sibal 
suggested that selling licenses at fixed prices benefited consumers because it led to lower prices for 
wireless service (Government of India 2011).
9 The total availability of spectrum, which determines the number of licenses awarded in a region, 
depends on its alternative uses: in the Indian context, the main alternative use was by the defense 
forces for communication. Below I show that the only factor consistently significantly associated 
with the number of corruptly allocated licenses is an indicator for regions that are a defense priority.
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acquired licenses on the number of wireless telephone subscribers, prices, firm 
revenues, and quality measures (for example, proportion of calls dropped) ag-
gregated at the regional level. Systematic and comprehensive investigations by 
two government entities—the CAG and CBI—allow me to examine two separate 
characterizations of whether a license was corruptly awarded. The CAG deter-
mined whether a license was awarded to an ineligible company,10 while the CBI 
determined whether evidence of wrongdoing by the company was uncovered.
Separating regions into those with many corrupt licenses and those with fewer 
corrupt licenses (or, alternatively, those with a greater proportion of corrupt li-
censes to new licenses awarded) and time periods into those before licenses were 
allocated and those after, I find that outcomes are, in general, no worse in the 
more corrupt11 areas after license allocation. The only consistently significant ef-
fect seems to be an improvement in quality measures, while the impacts on the 
number of subscribers, prices, minutes used, and revenues are statistically indis-
tinguishable from 0, with standard error bounds ruling out large negative im-
pacts. These results are robust to the addition of region-specific time trends to 
account for differential trends in outcomes prior to the license allocation,12 to 
redefining the period after allocation as that after the allocation of spectrum 
rather than licenses, and to alternative empirical methods using synthetic control 
groups. Corruption, then, had at worst no impact on consumer markets. To the 
extent that unobserved factors not absorbed by region and time fixed effects and 
region-by-time trends may have affected both license allocations and outcomes, 
these results must be viewed with caution.
In contrast to these results, the existing literature on the impact of corruption 
on firms finds large negative effects. For example, Fisman and Svensson (2007) 
find that a 1-percentage-point increase in bribes reduces annual firm growth by 
3 percentage points, while Sequeira and Djankov (2010) find that the diversion 
costs of corruption for each individual firm are on average three to four times 
higher than bribes paid. In a different context, Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2012) 
find educational outcomes in corrupt areas to be .35 of a standard deviation 
lower than in those without corruption. In India, and in particular for this scan-
dal, the presumption is that corruption slowed growth; an overview of corruption 
in India notes that “growth sputtered to a decade low in 2012, with many ob-
servers pointing to the corrosive effect of endemic corruption—including a spate 
of scandals under former prime minister Manmohan Singh—as a culprit” (Xu 
2014).
The fact that my results are not in line with the existing empirical evidence 
suggests that the context in which corruption takes place might matter. Two fea-
10 A company could be ineligible for two major reasons: because it misrepresented its core busi-
ness and because it did not have sufficient paid-up capital (equity capital from the sale of shares).
11 Note that “more corrupt” does not necessarily refer to the magnitude of corruption in these 
regions; it simply means that in these areas there was a greater number or proportion of corruptly 
awarded licenses.
12 Adding region-specific trends can be problematic if they are conflated with dynamic effects of 
the allocation (Wolfers 2006). Figure 4 shows that such effects, if any, are indistinguishable from 0.
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tures of the wireless-telecommunications market in India may help us under-
stand this contrast: the fact that licenses were acquired by firms different from 
those to which they were allocated and the levels of competition in the market. 
First, despite restrictions on the direct sale of licenses and spectrum, the firms 
that eventually obtained access to these licenses were not the firms that were 
awarded the licenses. While licenses were initially awarded to firms whose ability 
to efficiently provide wireless service might have been doubtful (for example, real 
estate companies, vegetable wholesalers, shell companies with no other physical 
or human capital), these licenses were subsequently acquired—at substantial pre-
mia, through complex arrangements of mergers and acquisitions—by firms such 
as telecommunications giants Telenor (Norway) and Etisalat (United Arab Emir-
ates). Sixty-eight percent of new licenses ended up with an entity distinct from 
the original licensee; there were also more mergers in the more corrupt areas (29 
percent of all license holders merged by December 2010) than in the less corrupt 
areas (23 percent).
Yet the secondary transfer of licenses is unlikely to explain on its own why cor-
ruption did not affect markets in this instance: Milgrom (2004, p. 20) writes, for 
example, that “the history of the US wireless telephone service offers direct ev-
idence that the fragmented and inefficient initial distribution of rights was not 
quickly correctable by market transactions.” First, there is no guarantee that the 
secondary transfers went to efficient firms: if efficient firms are also law abiding, 
they would stay away from corruptly acquired assets.13 Second, costs incurred 
by the acquiring firms could be passed on to consumers in the presence of mo-
nopoly power; for example, anecdotal evidence suggests that monopoly power 
wielded by coal-mining companies (which also procured licenses for coal mines 
in a corrupt allocation process) was responsible for efficiency losses in that sector 
(Sharma 2012).
Here, the existence of a number of large players14 and competition in the In-
dian wireless-telecommunications market also helps explain why negative im-
pacts of corruption were mitigated. With the entry of new firms after the alloca-
tion, measures of competitiveness increased dramatically in both corrupt and less 
corrupt areas: the number of providers almost doubled from an average of 6.6 to 
12.2 per region, while the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of market share 
declined by over 500 points.15 Regressions of the HHI suggest that, if anything, 
competition increased more in corrupt areas.
These results cast light on ongoing debates over the impact of corrupt activity. 
In Russia, for example, the privatization of government enterprises was widely 
accepted to have been characterized by cronyism and sweetheart deals. And yet 
13 Indian and international law prohibits such acquisitions; see, for example, the Prevention of 
Corruption Act (No. 49 of 1988, ch. 3) in India and the International Anti-bribery and Fair Com-
petition Act (Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 [1998]) and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-1) in the United States.
14 Four large firms held between 55 and 59 percent of the market share in both corrupt and non-
corrupt areas.
15 Author’s calculations from TRAI (2012) data.
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Shleifer and Treisman (2005) argue that the privatized companies subsequently 
performed very well. This disagreement points to a broader conundrum in the 
data: both macroeconomic (Mauro 1995) and microeconomic (Olken and Pande 
2012) evidence suggests that efficiency costs of corruption may be high, yet cor-
ruption is highest in the fastest-growing middle-income countries. One possible 
way to reconcile these facts is to argue that perhaps these countries would grow 
even faster in the absence of corruption. Another possibility is that corruption is 
simply a way of doing business in countries with weak judicial institutions.16 Un-
der these conditions, as long as markets are competitive and secondary transfers 
are possible, corruption is unlikely to impede growth.
This paper is also related to the extensive literature on the allocation of rights 
over natural resources in general and a large subset of that literature on the al-
location of radio frequency spectrum (see, for example, McMillan 1994; Klem-
perer 2002; Cramton et al. 2011; Hazlett 1990, 2008; Hazlett and Muñoz 2009). 
Attaining economic efficiency and raising revenue are the key—sometimes con-
flicting—goals of the allocation process, with other social goals such as reaching 
underserved communities or promoting minority businesses sometimes promi-
nent. Given the conditions of thin markets, natural monopolies, and the potential 
for collusion or corruption in the process (particularly in developing countries), 
much attention is paid to the form of the allocation process: for example, whether 
a beauty contest, lottery, or particular type of auction should be used and whether 
resale of rights is permitted. While in the Indian case there was no variation in 
the form of allocation, and direct resale remains forbidden, the incident provides 
some evidence that corruption in the initial allocation did not matter, which thus 
confirms the insight of Coase (1959, 1960).
While there may have been no direct efficiency consequences, the discretionary 
allocation at fixed prices did involve distributional consequences in the form of 
a substantial transfer of resources from the government to corrupt officials and 
companies. Estimates using the premia that the final owners paid suggest that 
this loss was around US$14.4 billion (CAG 2010).17 Moreover, this paper exam-
ines a particular type of corruption: bribery in the sale of government licenses; 
other types of corruption could have efficiency as well as distributional costs. Fi-
nally, the corrupt allocation may have had deleterious effects on other outcomes 
that are difficult to measure, for example, the breakdown of trust in government 
and the discouragement of market actors without political connections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents information on 
the industry and the license allocation procedure. Section 3 presents the data and 
empirical strategy, followed by the results in Section 4. Section 5 discusses these 
results and examines the effects on market structure.
16 Perhaps this reality is best expressed by an official in Mexico: “If we put everyone who’s corrupt 
in jail, who will close the door?” (Aridjis 2012).
17 Given that consumer surplus in wireless cellular markets is orders of magnitude higher than 
producer surplus (Hazlett and Muñoz 2009), many if not all economists suggest that raising reve-
nues should be of secondary consideration to achieving economic efficiency (Cramton et al. 2011). 
On the other hand, lost government revenues imply inefficiency given that taxation is distortionary.
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2. Background
2.1. Market Structure
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the wireless-telecommunications 
sector in India: the country has the cheapest and possibly the most accessible cell 
phone service in the world. The wireless-telecommunications market is very large 
and lucrative, with 900 million subscribers18 as of January 2012 and a growth 
rate of 1.1 percent a month. India’s absolute growth in number of subscribers in 
2010 was twice that of the next closest country (China), with prices per minute, 
at $.007, over 30 times lower than the most expensive (Japan) (TRAI 2012). To-
tal revenues for global system for mobile communications (GSM)19 operators (70 
percent of the market) in the second quarter of 2011 were approximately US$3.8 
billion, which extrapolates to total annual revenues for the entire sector of US$22 
billion.20 The fact that the number of landline subscriptions is tiny in compari-
son (30 million subscribers) and declining further increases the importance of 
the wireless segment of the telecommunications sector for communications in 
India. In their review of India’s economic liberalization and subsequent growth, 
Kotwal, Ramaswami, and Wadhwa (2011) suggest that communications technol-
ogy facilitated a quantum leap in the growth of the service sector.
Fifteen companies currently provide cellular service, with at least nine provid-
ing coverage nationwide and three others providing close to nationwide cover-
age.21 Competition for subscribers is fierce, especially since the introduction of 
mobile number portability. Bharti-Airtel holds the largest market share with 19.6 
percent as of February 2012, but there are eight companies with a market share 
of 5–20 percent. In comparison, the United States has only four large nationwide 
providers that held almost 95 percent of the market in 2011, with the two largest 
providers, Verizon (36.5 percent) and AT&T (32.1 percent), reaching almost 70 
percent by themselves.22
While competitive when compared with other countries, India’s wireless- 
telecommunications market can be best characterized as having oligopolistic 
18 A subscriber corresponds to a telephone number, not an individual. Most measures of tele-
phone density simply report the number of subscribers divided by the total population; hence, it is 
difficult to know what the penetration—the proportion of the population that has a mobile phone—
is. For comparison, in 2010 India had a telephone density of 63 percent, Russia had 166 percent, and 
the United States had 90 percent (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 2012).
19 The global system for mobile communications (GSM) is one of the two major cell phone trans-
mission systems. The other is code division multiple access (CDMA). In India the two systems are 
allocated slightly different parts of the spectrum. Other than revenues, which are not available for 
CDMA providers (the CDMA providers’ umbrella organization does not make them available), the 
differences between the two systems do not matter for the practical purposes of this paper.
20 Author’s calculations from TRAI (2012) data.
21 In descending order of market share, these companies are Bharti-Airtel, Reliance, Vodafone, 
Idea, BSNL, Tata, Aircel-Dishnet, Uninor, Sistema, Videocon, MTNL, Loop, STel, HFCL, and Eti-
salat.
22 Data on market share are from Statista, Market Share Held by Wireless Telecommunications Car-
riers in the U.S. in 2011 (http://www.statista.com/statistics/219720/market-share-of- wireless- carriers 
-in-the-us-by-subscriptions).
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competition. The average HHI for this sector over the analysis period was 2,093. 
The US Justice Department considers markets between 1,500 and 2,500 points 
to be moderately concentrated (US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission 2010). The main factor of production is a limited natural resource—
spectrum23—that is best used in discrete, uninterrupted chunks. Next, there are a 
number of fixed costs that may serve as barriers to entry—the construction of cell 
phone towers, the setup of marketing and distribution systems for subscriber ser-
vices,24 and technological know-how—many of which are subject to large econ-
omies of scale. On the other hand, a firm could conceivably rent a tower from a 
rival, outsource distribution systems, and license technological know-how, and 
many large Indian conglomerates have the capital to enter this market.
In this context, the entry of an inefficient firm would result in the underuse or 
disuse of allocated spectrum. The “wasteful use of the spectrum resource” and 
“uneconomic stock-piling of spectrum licenses” have long been recognized as 
problems to avoid in allocating spectrum (Melody 1980, p. 393). A significant 
proportion—on average 30 percent of existing spectrum—was auctioned in the 
new allocation described below. If a new entrant were too high cost to effectively 
use allocated spectrum in a market, slower overall subscriber growth might re-
sult. Moreover, the added pressure on the utilized spectrum might lead to prob-
lems with quality for existing providers, who may also charge higher prices. Fi-
nally, underused spectrum and licenses might reduce competitive pressure on 
incumbents, which could lead to reduced quality and higher prices (Cramton et 
al. 2011). The analysis below tests whether corruptly allocated licenses led to neg-
ative impacts on the number of subscribers and on quality and also resulted in 
higher prices. First, however, I describe the allocation procedure and resulting 
variation in corruption across regions.
2.2. License and Spectrum Allocation
The wireless-telecommunications sector was not always as dynamic as de-
scribed in Section 2.1: prior to 1994, services were provided by a single national-
ized monopoly provider and were widely considered to be abysmal. After 1994, 
private providers were allowed to operate limited services, but it was not until 
new policies (in 1999 and chiefly in 2002) reduced restrictions on the number 
of providers and their potential services that the wireless segment started its real 
growth path. While at the end of 2002 there were a handful of private service pro-
viders and only 6 million subscribers, by the end of 2006 the number of private 
23 Spectrum refers to electromagnetic frequency bands, some of which are reserved for the use of 
wireless telecommunications. In India, the National Frequency Allocation Plan (Government of In-
dia 2008) delineates the use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum among various users such as 
the defense forces, police, intelligence agencies, radio and TV broadcasting, energy utilities, airlines, 
and public and private telecommunications operators.
24 Ninety-five percent of subscribers in India have prepaid connections, which require constant 
refills via small retail shops. For comparison, only 15 percent of subscribers in the United States use 
a prepaid connection (TRAI 2012).
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service providers had expanded to 10, and there were 150 million wireless sub-
scribers in India.
Given the fast-paced growth, the telecommunications sector was viewed as an 
attractive investment opportunity, and a large number of firms wished to enter 
the market. To operate wireless service, firms need a license from the govern-
ment, which entitles them to obtain spectrum. The licenses and spectrum are re-
gion specific, spread over 22 regions (or telecom circles) across India.25 In 2007, 
a process of new license and spectrum allocation was initiated by the DoT. Li-
censes awarded through this new process were incremental to existing ones, and 
hence new firms had the opportunity to enter the market.26 Firms could apply for 
pan-India licenses and for licenses in particular regions and for either code divi-
sion multiple access (CDMA) or GSM spectrum. Licenses and spectrum awarded 
could not be sold to other entities.
Given that this was the first round of large-scale allocation of spectrum—over 
35 percent of existing capacity was due to be allocated—since the telecommu-
nications market had really started growing in India, it was eagerly anticipated 
by potential new entrants. Market growth was predicted to skyrocket, and the 
sector was young and far from saturated: true to predictions, market size quin-
tupled over the next 3 years (Corporate Catalyst India 2006).27 By October 2007, 
the DoT had received 575 applications for licenses from 46 companies; although 
the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) suggested that any applicant 
who satisfied certain eligibility criteria should receive a license, the amount of 
spectrum available for distribution was limited, and a rationing mechanism was 
necessary.
The ensuing process of license allocation led by then–Communication and In-
formation Technology minister Andimuthu Raja was severely criticized for its 
blatant arbitrariness and disregard for higher authority (including the Ministry of 
Finance and the prime minister).28 Instead of using an auction29 to limit the num-
ber of entrants and discover the market price of the spectrum, the licenses were 
sold at fixed June 2001 prices (in January 2008), with arbitrary rules—designed 
25 There were previously 23 regions in India, with the metropolis of Chennai considered its own 
region, as were Delhi, Kolkata, and Mumbai; however, by 2007 Chennai was absorbed into the re-
gion of Tamil Nadu.
26 The spectrum band to be allocated allowed for second-generation, or 2G, communications, 
which generally refer to digital (as opposed to analog) voice services and are basically comparable 
to first-generation communications in terms of revenue possibilities for firms. Third-generation, or 
3G, service generally refers to advanced voice and data networks, with far greater revenue potential 
(Hazlett 2008).
27 Incumbents were also extremely worried about new entry, so much so that one (Reliance) tried 
to set up a fake firm to bid for licenses in order to keep them from competitors (CAG 2010).
28 Raja is a member of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Party, a key supporter of the Congress 
Party–led United Progressive Alliance. With elections a year or so away, and his Congress Party 
with insufficient seats in the national parliament to form a government on its own, Prime Minister 
Man mohan Singh had little leverage over Raja. Raja could thus ignore the prime minister’s ques-
tions about equality and transparency in the spectrum allocation process.
29 As Hazlett (2008) suggests, there is widespread consensus that market mechanisms are superior 
to administrative methods in allocating spectrum.
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to favor firms connected to Raja—used to limit the number of licenses allotted. 
After not processing a number of applications for almost 2 years, on September 
24, 2007, the DoT suddenly announced that October 1, 2007, would be the dead-
line for accepting applications. However, on January 10, 2008, the deadline was 
reset to September 25, 2007, which allowed the DoT to rule out a number of ap-
plicants. Moreover, licenses and spectrum were meant to be allotted on a first-
come-first-served basis given the limited availability of spectrum. However, on 
January 10 at 2:45 p.m. the DoT posted an announcement saying that the current 
ordering applied only if payment was made between 3:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. that 
day. Applicants were ordered to show up with bank guarantees worth millions of 
dollars in a matter of minutes; of course, this was possible only for those parties 
who had prior intimation of this announcement. Eventually, 122 licenses were 
allotted to 17 companies across 22 regions; of these, the CAG determined that 
85 were allotted to companies that were ineligible on account of either misrepre-
senting their core business or not having sufficient paid-up capital.30 The CBI in-
dicted the chairs of companies that received 61 licenses. Links between these in-
eligible firms and Raja have been well documented (CAG 2010; Patil 2011; Times 
of India 2010).
The upshot of the process was that all companies who received licenses did so at 
a substantial discount; a large number of companies that received licenses should 
not have, given current regulations; and many of these companies jumped to the 
head of the queue for receiving spectrum. For example, Swan Telecom, a shell 
company with no assets, human capital, or telecommunications expertise, paid 
US$384 million for 13 licenses but subsequently sold equity worth 50 percent for 
US$900 million. Extrapolating from this equity dilution, the CAG calculated that 
the full set of licenses allocated should have been worth US$17.5 billion, as op-
posed to the US$3.1 billion received by the government.31 A rather more specu-
lative value of US$44.2 billion, calculated by using amounts spent on the April 
2010 auction of third-generation (3G) licenses, has been widely reported in the 
Indian press and is assumed to be the loss to the government.
Given the amounts involved, as well as the attempts by the government to 
sweep the controversy under the carpet prior to the May 2009 elections, the en-
suing scandal when news of the corruption broke out—only after taped phone 
conversations between a corporate lobbyist and a telecommunications company 
chairman were leaked to the press—was massive. Coming as it did among a spate 
of other scandals, such as corruption during the Commonwealth Games held 
30 Paid-up capital refers to money obtained through the sale of shares by a company as opposed 
to debt financing.
31 The assumptions made in the report (CAG 2010) were the following: Swan had no other assets, 
so the full value of the company (US$1.8 billion, Rs 72 billion) was equivalent to the value of the 
licenses acquired. This value was adjusted to account for the fact that Swan had 13 high-value li-
censes (that is, not representative of all licenses) and 35 dual-technology licenses (licenses to operate 
CDMA services granted to already licensed GSM operators or vice versa) and then extrapolated to 
the full set of 122 licenses. The precise scaling factors used are not available in the report, but other 
calculations in the report use reserve prices for subsequent auctions as a guide.
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in Delhi in 2010, the 2G scam (in reference to second-generation communica-
tions), as it is known in India, has dominated political discourse from late 2010 
until national elections in May 2014. It spawned the growth of an anticorruption 
movement and was presumably a major reason why Raja’s Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam Party lost elections in its home state of Tamil Nadu. Some have also 
argued that corruption scandals led to losses suffered by the Congress Party and 
its UPA allies in state elections across India. Most recently, a Supreme Court or-
der deemed the licenses allocated in the 2007–8 process void, calling on the TRAI 
to decide on a new procedure to reallocate the 122 licenses (Centre for Public In-
terest Litigation v. Union of India, W.P. [C.] No. 423 of 2010 and No. 10 of 2011 
[February 2, 2012]).
3. Empirical Strategy
3.1. Variation in Corrupt Allocation across Regions
Table 1 presents the distribution of newly allocated licenses across the 22 tele-
communications regions. The total number of new licenses awarded ranged from 
four in Mumbai and Rajasthan to seven in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and the 
Northeast, representing in all cases a substantive proportion of new entrants to 
the market. Every region had at least one license awarded to an ineligible com-
pany, with one region having five. All licensees (except three in Delhi) were even-
tually allocated spectrum, although this did not necessarily happen immediately; 
in Section 3.2 I show that the allocation of spectrum, which depended on whether 
the defense services were able to vacate the spectrum in a given area, was not any 
faster in more corrupt areas.
Prior to exploring what determined the variation in corrupt allocations across 
regions, it would be helpful to define “corrupt.” The CAG (2010) report docu-
ments in detail how individual applicants were ineligible for licenses, either be-
cause they misrepresented their primary business—for example, real estate com-
panies with no previous telecommunications experience received a large number 
of licenses—or because they did not have sufficient paid-up capital. Using the 
CAG’s determination of whether a firm should not have received a license allows 
me to test whether current regulations were indeed too stringent, in case these 
firms did improve efficiency. However, it is possible that not all ineligible firms 
were necessarily corrupt in that they did not pay bribes to receive their licenses. 
Fortunately, I can use CBI investigations to determine this corruption: these in-
vestigations revealed the links between some of the ineligible applicants and Raja, 
following the money trail of illicit payments to a cable television channel in South 
India (CAG 2010; Patil 2011; Times of India 2010). While two firms receiving 27 
licenses were deemed ineligible but were not indicted by the CBI, one firm receiv-
ing three licenses was not considered ineligible but was indicted. Hence, I present 
results below using both CAG and CBI definitions of illegality.
I use these designations of corruptly awarded licenses to determine which re-
gions were more versus less corrupt. Note that these labels do not necessarily re-
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flect the underlying levels of corruption in these regions: the allocation of licenses 
was determined centrally, and the exercise in this paper is to examine the im-
pact of the corrupt central allocation. As Table 1 shows, every region has at least 
one firm that received a license illegitimately. The number of illegally obtained 
licenses varies from two to five, depending on the CAG or CBI definition of il-
legality. There is more variation when the proportion, rather than the raw num-
ber, of new licenses that were corruptly awarded is considered: between .57 and 
1 for companies determined ineligible by the CAG and between .33 and .75 for 
companies with officials indicted by the CBI. Hence, I categorize more versus less 
corrupt regions by the number of corruptly awarded licenses and also by directly 
using the proportion of corruptly awarded new licenses, and I present results by 
the two definitions of corruption separately.
Why do some regions have more corruptly awarded licenses than others? A 
central authority determined the allocation of licenses across regions, conditional 
on receiving applications. The availability of spectrum in a region determined the 
overall number of licenses awarded in the region. The total availability of spec-
trum depends on its alternative uses: in the Indian context, the main alternative 
use is by the defense forces for communication. In addition, at the time of allo-
cation the amount of available spectrum depended on the amount of spectrum 
already distributed to preexisting licenses. Table 2 explores the correlates of li-
censes awarded. The total number of licenses awarded in a region was negatively 
correlated both with the existing number of operators and with whether the re-
gion was a defense priority32 region. None of the other factors that one might 
associate with the entry of new firms—market growth, concentration, or popu-
lation—is consistently significantly associated with higher levels of corruption.
The only factor consistently significantly associated with the number of cor-
ruptly allocated licenses is the indicator for defense priority regions. Defense re-
quirements are a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the allocation pro-
cedure across regions, particularly since other economic factors that one might 
expect to matter are not significantly associated with corrupt allocation. Of 
course, this limited exercise does not rule out other unobserved factors that may 
have affected license assignment. Below I describe the empirical specifications 
that build on this variation in corrupt license allocation across regions.
3.2. Data and Econometric Specifications
Economic efficiency in spectrum allocation is defined by Cramton et al. (2011, 
p. S169) as “assignment of licenses that maximizes the consumer value of wireless 
services less the cost of producing those services.” While it would be difficult to 
measure precisely whether the corrupt allocation did or did not achieve the best 
use of spectrum, data available from the telecommunications regulator and in-
32 This is simply an indicator for whether the region shares a border with hostile neighbors Paki-
stan, China, or Bangladesh; is a metropolitan area subject to terrorist attacks; or has major internal 
civil conflict led by armed Maoists.
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dustry associations provide reasonable proxies for consumer value and producer 
costs. The main outcome variables I consider are the number of subscribers, the 
average price per minute (including both origination and ongoing charges), the 
average number of call minutes per subscriber per month, average revenues per 
subscriber (or total revenues), and measures of service quality such as the pro-
portion of dropped calls, the proportion of calls that connect on first attempt, a 
measure of voice quality, and the proportion of customer service calls answered 
within 60 seconds. The number of subscribers, price per minute, minutes used, 
and quality of service serve as proxies for consumer surplus, while revenues per 
subscriber proxy for operator performance. All data are available at the operator 
level by either month or quarter and are aggregated to region-month or region- 
quarter depending on the frequency of reporting for the particular variable. The 
subscriber data are available from 2001 onward; quality, price, and usage data are 
available from 2004 onward; while revenue data are available only from 2005 on-
ward and are restricted to GSM operators. The price and usage data are available 
only at a higher level of aggregation for four telecom circles across India.
These data are from the TRAI, the main regulatory body, and the Cellular Op-
erators Association of India and the Association of Unified Telecom Service Pro-
viders of India (AUSPI), industry associations of GSM and CDMA providers, re-
spectively. Note that subscriber data are available separately from TRAI and the 
industry associations and match to a very high degree (ρ = .9977). Given security 
concerns around cell phones—they can be used to set off improvised explosive 
devices, for example—the last few years have seen strong efforts in tracking sub-
scriber and usage data, and hence the quality of these data is perceived to be very 
high.
Given that the new 2G license allocation process started in 2007, while the 
scandal broke in late 2010, I restrict my analysis to the time period between these 
events.33 I combine these data on the telecommunications industry with infor-
mation on the license and spectrum allocation process from the DoT, TRAI, 
CAG, and CBI and a special report compiled by an ex-Supreme Court justice and 
commissioned by the government. A DoT press release provides the full list of li-
censes allotted, while the special report and TRAI document contain the amounts 
and the dates on which spectrum was allocated. Table 3 presents summary statis-
tics on these outcome variables.
Separating regions into those with a high number and proportion of corrupt 
licenses (indicated by Corrupt) and those with fewer, as described in Section 3.1, 
and time periods into those before licenses were allocated and those after (Post), I 





s st= + × + + +∑ ∑α β ε( ) ,Post Corrupt Time Region  (1)
33 Robustness tests that expand and contract this period—for example, ending the period of study 
in April 2010, when further auctions for the 3G licenses took place, rather than December 2010, 
when the 2G scandal definitively broke out—find very similar results.
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where Yst is the number of subscribers, revenues per subscriber, or quality out-
comes and indicators for time periods (either months or quarters) and region 
serve as controls. Region fixed effects account for any time-invariant character-
istics that influence outcomes, while time fixed effects account for nationwide 
time-varying trends.34 I cluster standard errors along two dimensions (region and 
time) using the multiway clustering approach suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, 
and Miller (2008) and Thompson (2011).35
34 Tables A2 and A3 in the online appendix also show the basic difference-in-differences estimate 
without time or region fixed effects.
35 Note that the number of clusters in some of the regressions may be low: for example, there are 
22 regions, 16 quarters, and only four telecom circles in the data set. As a robustness check, I esti-
mate wild cluster percentile-t bootstraps as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) in all 
cases. This does not change inferences drawn from clustering on region or quarter dimensions. It 
does, however, make a large difference to inferences based on clustering at the circle level, which is 
Table 3
Summary Statistics by Regions’ Level of Corruption
Average More Corrupt Less Corrupt
Test of Equality 
(p-Value)
Subscribers 13,200,000 13,500,000 11,600,000 .97
(12,600,000) (13,400,000) (7,978,902)
ln(Subscribers) 15.86 15.82775 15.98328 .40
(1.19) (1.25) (.84)
HHI .23 .23 .2 .08
(.08) (.08) (.03)
Revenues 132.03 132.63 129.31 .55
(94.6) (99.66) (67.61)
ln(Revenues) 4.54 4.51 4.69 .41
(.93) (.98) (.67)
% Calls dropped 1.32 1.37 1.12 .60
(.55) (.59) (.31)
Voice quality 97.35 97.26 97.78 .24
(1.2) (1.28) (.59)
Minutes used 431.05 419.69 442.40 .17
(51.13) (51.35) (49.09)
Price per minute .77 .82 .71 .55
(.21) (.19) (.22)
Source. Data compiled from Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Monthly Press Reports (http://www 
.trai.gov.in/Content/PressReleases.aspx); Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Quarterly Performance 
Indicator Reports (http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/PerformanceIndicatorsReports/1_1_PerformanceIndi-
catorsReports.aspx); Cellular Operators Association of India, Statistics (http://www.coai.com/statistics/
arpu‐and‐revenuereport); and Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India, Subscriber Data 
(http://www.auspi.in/search‐subscriber.asp).
Note. More and less corrupt areas are determined by the number of illegitimate licenses.The p-values are 
for the difference in outcomes in regions prior to January 2008. Subscribers are total number of wireless 
subscribers in a telecommunications region (monthly data for 2005–10). The Herfindahl-Hirschman in-
dex (HHI) is for monthly market concentration for 2005–10. Revenues are quarterly averages per operator 
across the global system for mobile communications operators in the region for 2005–10 in tens of millions 
of rupees. All other variables are subscriber-weighted averages across all operators in the region. Voice qual-
ity refers to the clarity of the sound transfer in a call measured by an index from 1 to 100 (quarterly data for 
2007–10). Minutes used are the total number of minutes (incoming and outgoing) per subscriber per month 
averaged across months, while price per minute is the average price in rupees per minute (both quarterly 
data at the telecom circle level for 2007–10).
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One possible confound is that corrupt areas may simply have received spec-
trum earlier. To check for this, I adapt a procedure first used by Griliches (1957) 
to estimate the speed of diffusion of hybrid corn and adapted and described in 
Skinner and Staiger (2007). The idea is to run a logistic estimation of the form
 ln Corrupt Time Time Corrupt( ( ) ( ),P K Pst s st s t/ − = + + + ×α β δ γ  (2)
where Pst is the (cumulative) fraction of allocated spectrum received by time t 
in region s, Ks is the maximum fraction of allotted spectrum received, Corrupts 
indicates a state with a high number and proportion of corrupt licenses and re-
veals the difference in time to first obtaining spectrum, Timet is a time trend, and 
the interaction γ indicates whether more corrupt regions receive their allocations 
faster. Since Ks is 1 for every state, and the initial fraction of allotted spectrum 
is 0, I cannot simply run a logistic estimation and instead use generalized least 
squares estimation with a logistic link. Table A1 in the online appendix suggests 
that corrupt areas were not likely to receive spectrum any faster, nor was the date 
of first spectrum release any faster. To be conservative, however, I also control 








= + × +
+ +∑ ∑
α β γ( ) ( )Post Corrupt AmtSpectrum
Time Region + εst .
 (3)
Another potential problem is that preexisting trends within regions may con-
found the difference-in-differences analysis. For example, graphs of the time 
trend in subscribers show a divergence between corrupt and less corrupt regions 
prior to the license allocation process (Figures 1 and 2). This is also true for log 
subscribers, prices, and revenues—with more corrupt areas growing faster or de-
clining less slowly than less corrupt areas—but not in general true for the qual-
ity variables. Moreover, general economic trends do not seem to be different be-
tween corrupt and less corrupt areas, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. Nonetheless, 












α β γ( ) ( )Post Corrupt AmtSpectrum Time
Region + × +∑
s
s t st( ) .Region Time ε
 (4)
Note that this estimation might conflate any dynamic effects of the license allo-
cation with the region-specific time trends (Wolfers 2006). To separate out these 
effects, I include indicators for time periods in the postallocation period in cor-
rupt areas and perform the following estimation:
not surprising since there are only four circle clusters. Hence, for regressions with price and minutes 
of use as outcomes, I present the p-values from the wild cluster percentile-t bootstraps instead of 
standard errors.
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Figure 5. Dynamics of the postallocation period in more corrupt areas: licenses to firms de-
clared ineligible by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
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Figure 6. Dynamics of the postallocation period in more corrupt areas: licenses to firms in-
dicted by the Central Bureau of Investigation.
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The coefficients βk are presented in Figures 5 and 6.36
Despite the evidence presented in Section 3.1 suggesting that defense require-
ments drove the license allocation, it is possible that other unobserved factors 
were involved. For example, corrupt allocation of licenses may have been driven 
by unobserved future potential for growth. To the extent that this potential was 
predicted by preexisting trends and fixed regional characteristics—and as the re-
sults below suggest, these do indeed have very high predictive power—the inclu-
sion of fixed effects and trends ameliorates some of these concerns. To the extent 
that unobserved factors beyond these controls may have influenced outcomes, 
the results below must be interpreted with caution.
4. Results
A glance at Table 4 suggests that the corrupt sale of licenses had no significant 
effects on the number of wireless telephone subscribers. The results are similar 
if the proportion of new licenses received illegally in each region is considered 
rather than a simple categorization into more versus less corrupt regions. When 
region-specific linear time trends are introduced into the regressions, the coeffi-
cients drop dramatically and even turn negative (column 4), although the magni-
tudes are very small (less than .002 of a standard deviation). The dynamics of the 
postallocation period, shown in Figures 5A and 6A, suggest that these trends are 
not conflating dynamic effects.37
While determining whether results are precisely estimated is a somewhat sub-
jective exercise, and the standard errors used are conservative (multiway clus-
tered at the region and time levels), these results suggest that the difference be-
tween more and less corrupt regions was a narrowly estimated 0 (standard errors 
on the order of 200,000, or about 1.5 percent of the standard deviation or 1.2 
percent of the mean), at least for the first year after the license allocations. After 
this period, while the standard errors increase, so does the magnitude of the co-
efficients. Hence, even 24 months after the new licenses were allotted, the 95 per-
cent confidence intervals allow me to rule out negative effects greater than .01 of 
a standard deviation.
36 Figures 5A, 5C, 6A, and 6C plot coefficients on indicators for month and include standard er-
rors. Figures 5B and 6B plot coefficients on indicators for quarter, where the comparison regions 
indicate the regions with the lowest levels of corruption.
37 Given that the average number of subscribers in corrupt versus less corrupt areas was quite dif-
ferent prior to the allocation of licenses, difference-in-differences estimations will be sensitive to the 
functional form. The log results mostly mirror the levels results: corrupt areas do not appear to be 
significantly different than less corrupt areas after allocation (see Table A8 in the online appendix).
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How did the corrupt allocation affect firm revenues? Revenues might be in-
terpreted as an indicator of profitability of firms in the region. This outcome is 
available only for GSM providers, so the results must be interpreted with caution. 
Nonetheless, Table 4 presents some evidence that firms in more corrupt regions 
seem to have significantly increased revenue levels after the allocation, with in-
creases of 25 percent. This does not seem to be true when the outcome is specified 
in logs rather than levels (Table A8 in the online appendix). The results also dis-
appear when the dynamics of the post-allocation period are taken into account 
(Figures 5 and 6).
The corrupt license allocation also does not seem to have negatively affected 
consumers. As shown in Table 5, data on the quality of service provided, such 
as the proportion of calls dropped or TRAI measures of average voice quality, 
suggest that more corrupt areas were again similar to less corrupt areas after the 
license allocation. The results indicate that, if anything, quality improved in more 
corrupt areas after the allocation.
Results on prices paid per minute and minutes used must be interpreted with 
two caveats in mind: first, the data are aggregated at a higher level (to telecom cir-
cles), and hence coefficients are not directly comparable; and second, since there 
are only four region categories, clustered standard errors can be inappropriate. 
Table 6 thus shows p-values from a wild cluster percentile-t bootstrap (Cameron, 
Table 7
Tracing Licenses








Adonis Projects Pvt. Ltd. Uninor 6 1 1
Allianz Infratech Pvt. Ltd. Etisalat 2 1 1
Aska Projects Ltd. Uninor 3 1 1
Azare Properties Ltd. Uninor 1 1 1
Datacom Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Videocon 21 1 0
Hudson Properties Ltd. Uninor 1 1 1
Idea Cellular Ltd.a Idea Cellular Ltd. 9 0 0
Loop Telecom Private Ltd.a Loop Telecom Private Ltd. 21 1 1
Nahan Properties Pvt. Ltd. Uninor 6 1 1
Shyam Telelink Limited Sistema Shyam 21 0 0
Spice Communications Ltd. Idea Cellular Ltd. 4 0 0
S Tel Ltd.a S Tel Ltd. 6 1 0
Swan Telecom Pvt. Ltd. Etisalat 13 1 1
Tata Teleservices Ltd.a Tata Docomo 3 0 1
Unitech Builders & Estates Pvt. Ltd. Uninor 1 1 1
Unitech Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. Uninor 1 1 1
Volga Properties Pvt. Ltd. Uninor 3 1 1
Note. The data are for the 122 licenses granted in 2008. Note that Tata Teleservices and S Tel both sold eq-
uity to other entities but retained over 50 percent ownership. CAG = Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India; CBI = Central Bureau of Investigation.
a The original owner of the license and the eventual operator are the same entity.
This content downloaded from 129.170.116.235 on June 07, 2018 10:47:28 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
 Corruption and Consumer Markets 103
Gelbach, and Miller 2008) instead of standard errors. The results again suggest 
that neither prices per minute nor minutes used per subscriber were consistently 
significantly different in more corrupt circles after allocation.
4.1. Robustness Checks
The results above are robust to a variety of checks. The first check changes the 
definition of the postallocation period to the period after spectrum, rather than li-
censes, is assigned. Spectrum was allocated as soon as it was available; some spec-
trum may have been vacant at the time of license allocation, while other pieces 
may have been in use by the defense forces. The advantage of this definition is 
that it better captures when a firm can start operating; moreover, the empirical 
specification corresponds better to a standard state-level difference-in-differences 
model based on differential timing of policy changes. The disadvantage is that 
the timing may be endogenous, given that corrupt firms might have been able to 
influence the spectrum allocation date. In any case, using either the date when 
the first firm received new spectrum in a region or the date when all firms had 
received their allotment does not qualitatively change the results described above, 
as shown in Tables A4–A7 in the online appendix.
A second robustness check changes the empirical methodology used to the 
synthetic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Aba-
die, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). This method for causal inference “pro-
vides a data-driven procedure to construct synthetic control units based on a 
convex combination of comparison units that approximates the characteristics of 
Table 8
Market Shares of Wireless Subscribers in a Region-Month: Herfindahl-Hirshman Index
CAG Deemed Ineligible Indicted by CBI
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Number of new licenses:
 Corrupt × Post −.0108 .00478 −.0199* −.00812
(.00989) (.0100) (.00808) (.0107)
 Adjusted R2 .926 .974 .927 .974
Proportion of new licenses:
 Corrupt × Post −.0921 −.0389 −.134** −.0760***
(.0642) (.0272) (.0698) (.0282)
 Adjusted R2 .928 .974 .929 .975
Region × Time No Yes No Yes
Note. Values are the results of difference-in-differences regressions. In the first set of regressions, Corrupt is 
an indicator for whether the region has a high number of illegitimately allotted licenses as determined by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) or the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and in the 
second set of regressions it refers to the proportion of illegitimately allotted licenses to all new licenses. The 
variable Post is an indicator for months after February 2008. All regressions include region and time fixed 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are multiway clustered by month and region. N = 1,584.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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the unit that is exposed to the intervention.”38 The synthetic control group is con-
structed using preintervention characteristics—in this case I use controls includ-
ing population, literacy, state gross domestic product (GDP), cumulative spec-
trum availability in various bands, and pre-allocation-period outcomes. Since the 
method is designed for estimating effects in settings where a single unit is ex-
posed to treatment, and in this case there are more units exposed to treatment 
rather than controls, I flip the designation of treatment to allow for a larger set of 
potential control units, and I collapse the new treated units into one using simple 
averaging as suggested by the method’s creators.
Figures A1 and A3 in the online appendix show predicted outcomes for the 
synthetic control group (the more corrupt areas in this case) versus the treatment 
group (the less corrupt areas). As is clear from the figures, the outcomes basically 
line up exactly after allocation of licenses. This is particularly noticeable in cases 
in which the preallocation outcomes can be precisely predicted. Where prealloca-
tion outcomes cannot be precisely predicted, the postallocation outcomes of the 
groups are not as well aligned.39
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, the estimations suggest that the corrupt allocation had, at worst, no 
measurable impact on activity in wireless-telecommunications markets, which 
runs counter to much of the macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence on 
the impact of corruption and the perception (in India at least) of the effect of 
corruption scandals on growth. For example, Mauro (1995) suggests that im-
proving a country’s corruption index score by 1 standard deviation would lead to 
a .8- percentage-point increase in the annual growth rate of GDP. In the micro-
economic literature, Fisman and Svensson (2007) find that a 1-percentage-point 
increase in bribes reduces annual firm growth by 3 percentage points; Sequeira 
and Djankov (2010) find that firms suffer costs that are on average three to four 
times higher than bribes paid for transport to ports with less corruption; and Fer-
raz, Finan, and Moreira (2012) show educational outcomes to be .35 of a stan-
dard deviation lower in corrupt areas than in areas without corruption.
What might explain this discord? First, despite the restrictions on the direct 
sale and transfer of licenses and spectrum, firms who illegitimately received the 
licenses transferred them to other firms through a complex series of mergers and 
acquisitions. Table 7 tracks licenses from initial allocation to eventual user. It 
shows, for example, that the shell company Swan was acquired by telecommuni-
cations giant Etisalat. Licenses held by a group of real estate companies (Adonis 
and Unitech) were eventually obtained by Uninor, which is a subsidiary of the 
38 Jens Hainmueller, Synth Package (http://web.stanford.edu/~jhain/synthpage.html).
39 Inference in this method is through the use of placebo tests in which the synthetic control 
method is applied to areas that did not receive the intervention. The gap between treatment and 
synthetic control groups is compared with the gaps between the placebo treatment and synthetic 
control groups. As Figures A2 and A4 in the online appendix show, the actual gap is in fact much 
smaller than the placebo gaps, which suggests that there is no effect of the corrupt allocation.
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Norwegian firm Telenor. Eventually, 83 of the 122 licenses allocated (68 percent) 
were acquired by other firms through mergers or dilution of equity. Such trans-
fers have occurred in other countries as well when the initial licensee was not 
necessarily set up to efficiently provide wireless-telecommunications service: for 
example, McMillan (1994) recounts the case of an obscure group obtaining via 
lottery a license to provide wireless service on Cape Cod (in the United States) 
and promptly selling it to Southwestern Bell for a large profit. Since there were 
more corruptly allocated licenses in more corrupt areas (by definition), there 
were significantly more mergers in these areas (29 percent of all licensed entities) 
than in less corrupt areas (23 percent).
However, the transfer of licenses to other firms does not seem sufficient, by 
itself, to explain why corruption had no impact. There is no guarantee that the 
firms that obtained licenses through secondary transfers were necessarily effi-
cient: for example, it is possible that efficient yet law-abiding firms may not nec-
essarily wish to obtain corruptly acquired assets. If acquiring licenses confers mo-
nopoly power to the new firms, they may pass on costs to customers, as seems to 
be the case with coal-mining companies in India (Sharma 2012). 
In the case of the 2G allocation, the degree of competitiveness in the wireless- 
telecommunications market may have forced new entrants to provide services ef-
ficiently. As described above, wireless-telecommunications markets in India tend 
to be characterized by aggressive competition for subscribers. There were 6.6 pro-
viders on average per region prior to the new allocation, but by December 2010, 
following new allocation and consolidation, there were 12.2 providers per region. 
Of course, some of these new providers could be small and inconsequential, but 
other more reliable measures also suggest large increases in competition. In both 
corrupt and noncorrupt areas, the four largest firms held only about 55–59 per-
cent of the market share.
Figure 2 suggests that competitiveness, as measured by the HHI of market 
share, increased dramatically after the new spectrum allocation in both types of 
regions, following a brief lag possibly related to the handover of spectrum and 
setting up of new service providers. The HHI decreased from an average of 2,233 
points in January 2008 to an average of 1,710 points by December 2010, a drop 
of 23.4 percent. For context, a merger that would increase concentration by 200 
points in already concentrated markets would be presumed likely to enhance 
market power and hence come under scrutiny by the US Department of Justice 
and Federal Trade Commission. In comparison, a 513-point decrease appears to 
be a substantial increase in competition (US Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission 2010). Meanwhile, the decreases in corrupt and noncorrupt 
regions appear to be relatively similar.
Regression analysis confirms this story. Table 8 shows that the effect of the new 
allocation on HHI in corrupt regions was basically indistinguishable from that in 
less corrupt regions. With the inclusion of region-specific trends, it appears that 
there was perhaps a small increase in competitiveness, although the effect sizes 
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are small. Moreover, Figure 6C suggests that some of this effect might be a confla-
tion of the dynamics, likely related to the lag in HHI decline after the allocation.
A final piece of evidence on competitiveness is provided by data on telecom-
munications firm profits around the world (TRAI 2012). A comparison of 31 
global telecommunications companies shows that the three Indian companies in 
the sample are all in the bottom half in terms of profits before taxes, with the 
best-performing Indian company at number 20 in the rankings. Moreover, the 
three Indian companies are the top three in the list of companies with the biggest 
decline in profits in the year 2010.
Thus, the Indian wireless-telecommunications sector was more competitive 
than wireless-telecommunications sectors in other countries at the outset, and 
competition increased even more with the allocation of new licenses. The fact that 
changes in market structure were similar across corrupt and less corrupt regions 
might at least partly explain why changes in other outcomes were also similar. 
Overall, in the Indian 2G spectrum case, it appears that the Coase (1959, 1960) 
theorem applies—the initial misallocation of licenses was corrected through the 
secondary market.40
In summary, then, this paper has investigated the impact of the corrupt alloca-
tion of wireless licenses and spectrum on activity in the cellular telecommunica-
tions market in India. I find that although many firms that received licenses had 
no prior experience in providing wireless services, this had, at worst, no mea-
surable impact on the number of wireless subscribers, revenues, prices, usage, 
or measures of quality. The lack of an effect of corruption on consumer markets 
may be explained by a combination of factors: one potential explanation is that 
the licenses were transferred to other firms better equipped to provide wireless- 
telecommunications services and another may be the presence of existing large 
players and competition in the wireless-telecommunications market. The same 
corruption was, however, very costly to the Indian government in terms of lost 
revenues. Moreover, the ensuing scandal carries with it potential—but not easily 
measurable—social and political costs associated with decreasing levels of public 
trust and increasing cronyism. Nonetheless, under the conditions of competitive 
markets and secondary license transfers, the corrupt allocation of licenses to ill-
equipped firms did not result in efficiency costs passed on to the consumer, and 
the initial allocation of property rights did not matter.
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